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I. INTRODUCION
African-Americans have suffered mistreatment and discrimination for over
three centuries.1 Although great strides have been made in the last three
decades, African-Americans in the United States have not yet reached equality
with white Americans.
Today, an eighteen-year-old white male will live 6.7 years longer than an
eighteen-year-old black male.2 The average African-American family earns
$12,323 less than the average white American family. 3 Thirty-one percent of
all African-American families have incomes below the poverty level, in
contrast to ten percent of all white families.4 Moreover, African-Americans
suffer from unemployment at a rate of 11.3 percent, whereas the white
American unemployment rate is only 4.7 percent.5 Probably the most revealing
statistic concerns the number of African-American professionals. Although
African-Americans represent 12 percent of the total U.S. population, they only
account for 6.1 percent of all managers, 2.1 percent of all architects, 3.6
percent of all engineers, 3.3 percent of all physicians, 4.3 percent of all
dentists, 4.3 percent of all college and university professors, and 3.2 percent of
all lawyers and judges.6
These figures clearly indicate that African-Americans have not reached
equality with white Americans. Obviously, no single remedy exists to reverse
centuries of unequal treatment which has resulted in the current status of
African-Americans. Affirmative action, 7 however, is an inextricable component
1 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387-88 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring). African-Americans were dragged to the United States in chains and sold
into slavery three hundred and fifty years ago. Id., cited in J.H. FRANKLIN, FROM
SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (4th ed. 1974).
2 Figures compiled by author using data from STATLSCAL ABSTRACT OF U.S. 74
(111th ed. 1991) (table 107), source U.S. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTIcs.
3 Id. at 449 (table 722), source U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, series P-60, No. 168.
4 Id. at 464 (table 750).
5 IL at 386 (table 635), source U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT
AND EARNINGS.
6 Id. at 12, 395 (tables 11,652).
7 The term affirmative action will be used to mean a private or governmentally
imposed program designed to remedy discriminatory practices and to redress past
discrimination in education, employment, and government spending.
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of a multifrious solution to the plight of African-Americans. 8 As Justice
Marshall stated in his concurring opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,9 bringing African-Americans into the "mainstream of
American life should be a state interest of the highest order," 10 so that all
Americans can be afforded "an equal opportunity to buy homes, attend schools,
attain government contracts and find jobs." 1 Unfortunately, the concept of
affirmative action has become one of the most controversial and least
understood issues of constitutional law. As a result, affirmative action has come
under relentless attack.
The purpose of this Note is not to argue the constitutionality or legitimacy
of affirmative action. The Supreme Court and many constitutional scholars
have firmly recognized the legality and the importance of affirmative action. 12
Moreover, the current status of African-Americans certainly justifies its need.
The recent Supreme Court decision of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,13
however, has cast doubt on the future status of affirmative action in public
contracting. This Note will examine the history and constitutional jurisprudence
of affirmative action which lead up to Croson. It will also describe in detail
8 Other solutions include: Providing more positive role models for African-
Americans, strengthening the family unit (including family emphasis on the importance of
education and providing support for other family members in their pursuit of education),
providing quality health care, and providing vocational training, to name a few.
9 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring).
10 Id. at 396.
11 Joint Statement, Constitutiona! Scholars' Statement on Affirnative Action After City
of Richmond v. I. A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L. . 1711, 1711 (1989) [hereinafter Joint
Statement] (Joint statement released by constitutional scholar conference on the meaning of
City of Richnond v. J. A. Croson Co.).
12 See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding legal a
voluntary affirmative action plan designed to increase representation of women in areas
traditionally underrepresented); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (holding
constitutional, a judicially imposed affirmative action plan which requires 50% of
Alabama's state police promotions to go to blacks until a given rank is 25% black or the
State implements a promotion plan); Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (holding constitutional, consent decrees allowing
affirmative action); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421 (1986) (holding that district courts have power to order affirmative action, including
numerical quotas, to counteract egregious discrimination); Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S.
448 (1980) (holding constitutional, 10% minority set-aside for federal public works
projects); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding legal, a
voluntary affirmative action plan which reserves 50% of apprenticeship slots to blacks);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding constitutional, medical
school's use of race as a selection criteria in admissions); Joint Statement, supra note 11.
13 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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what municipalities and other local governments must do in order to adopt a
constitutionally permissible affirmative action plan.
II. HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The idea of a government taking an active role in providing opportunities
for minorities because of past discrimination is primarily a phenomenon of the
civil rights movement of the 1960s. In fact, President John F. Kennedy coined
the term "affirmative action." 14 In 1961 President Kennedy issued Executive
Order 10925, requiring federal contractors to take whatever action necessary to
"ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during
employment, without regard to their race, creed, color or national origin." 15
Executive Order 10925 also called for the establishment of the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and for the first time imposed
penalties for non-compliance. 16
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson continued President Kennedy's
efforts with Executive Order 11246. Executive Order 11246 incorporated the
language used in Executive Order 10925 but added the language of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that forbids federal contractors from
discriminating against any employee "on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 17 In addition to modifying the language of the order,
President Johnson's executive order called for specific affirmative action in
employment, recruitment, layoffs, terminations, compensation, and selection
for training.18 It also called for the creation of the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance to replace the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity. 19
The Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs did not promulgate guidelines for Executive Order 11246 until
1972.20 The guidelines require non-construction contractors with 50 or more
employees, and contracts of $50,000 or more, to develop a detailed written
affirmative action plan for their companies in order to receive federal
14 BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., AFFIRMATIVE ACnION TODAY: A LEAAL
AND PRACrICAL ANALYSIS 7 (1986) [hereinafter BNA], according to HERBERT
HAMMERMAN, A DECADE OF OPPORTUNrY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1970S
(1984).15 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 450 (1959-1963).
16 Id. Many of the penalties called for cancellation of federal contracts. However, a
contractor was determined to be in compliance if it made "good faith efforts" to comply.
17 BNA, supra note 14, at 7.18 Id. at8.
19 Id. at 7.
20Id. at8.
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contracts. 21 Additionally, contrary to common public perception, the guidelines
state that any goals a contractor may set pursuant to an affirmative action plan
"may not be rigid and inflexible quotas which must be met, but must be targets
reasonably attainable, by means of applying every good faith effort to make all
aspects of the entire affirmative action program work." 22
In addition to early executive commitment to affirmative action under the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Congress and other administrative
agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
have also demonstrated a commitment to affirmative action during the early
stages of its inception.23 In 1972, Congress amended section 706(g) of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to apply to governmental agencies. Section
706(g) states that if there is a finding of discrimination, courts can order
affirmative action. 24 In 1979, the EEOC promulgated guidelines which permit
employers to undertake voluntary affirmative action.25 EEOC guidelines also
mandate that Title VII shall apply to private employers with at least fifteen
employees and non-federal public employers and unions. 26
The executive and legislative branches were not the only branches of the
federal government responsible for developing the concept and legality of
affirmative action. The judicial branch has played a pivotal role in developing
and legally sanctioning affirmative action in education, employment, and public
21 Id. Construction contractors are covered under Executive Orders 11114 and 11246,
and guidelines for federal construction contractors were promulgated in 1980. The Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs defines an affirmative action plan as a "set of
specific and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor commits himself to apply
every good faith effort." Id. at 8-9.
22 Id. (emphasis added).
23 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the EEOC, which became
operational on July 2, 1965. The purpose of the EEOC is to end all forms of discrimination
in all aspects of employment and to encourage employers to promote equal opportunity for
all employees.
24 BNA, supra note 14, at 9. Section 706(g) states:
If the court finds that [a governmental agency] has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the [governmental agency] from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by
the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be,
responsible for the unlawful employment practice)....
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (amended
1972) (emphasis added).
25 BNA, supra note 14, at 9.
26/Id
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contracting. The courts have played an even more important role during the
1980s when the increasingly conservative executive branch cut back on many
affirmative action programs.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
A. Background
It has been firmly established in equal protection jurisprudence that any
race-specific classification that expressly disadvantages racial minorities is
inherently "suspect" and will be subject to "strict scrutiny" and upheld only if
necessary to promote a "compelling" state interest.27 Use of "suspect"
classifications in racial discrimination cases posed no legal problems until
various government agencies during the 1960s and 1970s initiated large-scale
programs which gave racial minorities advantages over non-minorities to
redress past discrimination. Eventually, opponents of these programs
questioned whether the same strict scrutiny test used for suspect classifications
also applied to classifications which advantage racial minorities, commonly
referred to as benign classifications. 28 These challenges to benign race-based
classifications marked the beginning of the "backlash" era, which began in the
early 1980s.29 Today this backlash continues and charges of reverse
discrimination are increasing.
The Supreme Court first faced the issue of reverse discrimination, and
whether strict scrutiny ought to be applied to benign classifications, in DeFunis
v. Odegaard.30 DeFunis involved an affirmative action program which gave
minority applicants preferential treatment in admission to the University of
Washington law school. The petitioner, a white male, brought suit against the
law school arguing that the school violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights because less qualified Blacks were admitted over him. The
Supreme Court postponed addressing the issue of what level of scrutiny to
27 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). See also LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW 1524 (2d ed. 1988); GEOFFREY R. STONE Er. AL.,
CoNsTrrUTIoNAL LAW 528-43 (1986). The Court will find any use of racial classifications
invalid unless there is an overriding interest of the government. The theory is that any
classification which burdens racial minorities runs counter to the fundamental concept of
equal protection. In order for a racial classification to be upheld, the governmental interest
must outweigh the basic purpose of equal protection. As a result of this strict scrutiny
analysis, no racial classification which burden minorities have been upheld since 1945.
RONALD D. ROTUNDA Er. AL., TREATISE ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: SuSTANcE AND
PROCEDURE § 14.5 (3d ed. 1986).2 8 See STONE, supra note 27, at 578.
2 9 See GERALD R. GILL, MEANNESS MANIA: THE CHANGED MOOD (1980).
30 416 U.S. 312 (1974). See also STONE, supra note 27, at 581.
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apply and instead decided that the issue was rendered moot by an earlier court
order allowing the petitioner to attend the law school.31 DeFunis left the door
open for future attacks on preferential treatment in admissions and other
affirmative action programs.
The Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue of benign racial
classifications in Regents of the University of alifornia v. Bakke,32 probably
one of the most controversial cases in Supreme Court history. As in DeFunis,
the Bakke case also involved an aggressive affirmative action program which
gave preferential treatment to minority students applying to the University of
California at Davis medical school. The University of California at Davis
Medical School program reserved sixteen seats in the entering class of 100 for
minority applicants. 33 Bakke challenged the program, arguing that it violated
his fourteenth amendment right to equal protection under the law.34 In a
divided opinion, a five to four majority ruled that race could be used as a
criterion for admissions if the program is "properly devised." 35 The Court,
however, struck down the rigid set-aside of sixteen seats for minority
applicants, stating that the university failed to show a "substantial state
interest." 36 Although the Court squarely addressed the issue of benign
classifications in admissions policies, the decision left more questions than it
answered. 37 Most importantly, the divided opinion did not establish what level
of scrutiny would be used in affirmative action cases. 38
Bakke thus set the stage for the affirmative action battle. This highly
controversial case spurred debate and speculation among commentators about
31 Justice Douglas argued for the strict scrutiny test even for benign classifications. 416
U.S. at 320-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
33 Id. at 279.
3 4 Bakke was a white male who had previously attempted to gain admission but was
denied, despite his objectively superior academic credentials. See id. at 276-78. Bakke also
challenged the program under § 601 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See id. at
278. A minority of four Justices decided the case under Title VI. See id. at 412-21
(Stevens, I., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger,
C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
35 Id. at 320 (Powell, I., joined by White, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, 31.).
36 Id. at 320. This analysis is under the fourteenth amendment. Under Title VI Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist would have invalidated the
program. Id. at 408-21.
37 BNA, supra note 14, at 24.
38 Only Justice Powell advocated strict scrutiny while Justices White, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun advocated a more intermediate level of scrutiny. 438 U.S. at 359
(opinion of Brennan J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, UJ.). See TRIBE, supra
note 27, at 1530. Since Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist
decided the case on statutory grounds, it is not totally clear what level of scrutiny they
would have used.
[Vol. 53:555
PERMISSIBLE MINORITY SET-ASIDE
what the case would mean for the numerous programs adopted by previous
governmental entities. Surprisingly, many of the court decisions following
Bakke supported the legality of affirmative action.
B. Post-Bakke Cases
The first affirmative action case after Bakke involved a challenge to a
private voluntary affirmative action plan which reserved fifty percent of United
Steel Workers' apprenticeship positions for Blacks. 39 In United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,4° a white candidate for a craft-training apprenticeship
challenged the plan on the grounds that it violated his Title VII right of
protection against employer discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.41 The Court held five to two that the plan did not constitute
discrimination, 42 stating that the plan was voluntary and did not "unnecessarily
trammel" the interests of white employees. 43 Although Weber established the
legality of minority set-aside programs by private companies under Title VII,44
it was silent on the constitutionality of similar programs by governmental
entities. Moreover, two other pressing questions were not answered by Weber.
First, how much of a statistical disparity was needed to justify an affirmative
action plan? Second, would the Court use a strict scrutiny test or a lower level
of scrutiny for constitutional challenges?45
The constitutional question of whether an affimative action plan is
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was decisively answered in Fullilove v. Ilutznick.46 Fullilove involved a
minority set-aside program in which Congress mandated that ten percent of all
federal funds granted for public projects be used to procure services or supplies
from minority business enterprises (MBEs). 47 In a six-to-three decision, the
39 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
40 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
41 Id. at 199-200.
42 Id. at 208. See also TRIBE, supra note 27, at 1531. Weber challenged the plan
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) & (d). Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, reasoned that the purpose of the plan was "to break down
old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" and therefore it was a legitimate means of
redressing racial discrimination. Id. at 208, quoted in TRIBE, supra note 27, at 1531.
43 Id. at 208. Justice Brennan distinguished the United Steelworkers' plan from the
U.C. Davis plan by stating that this plan did not "require the discharge of white workers
and their replacement with new black hirees," nor did it "create an absolute bar to the
advancement of white employees." Id. at 208, quoted in TRIBE, supra note 27, at 1531.
44 The plan was upheld by a 5-2 majority. 443 U.S. at 195.
45 See BNA, supra note 14, at 25.
46 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
47 Id. at 453. Congress defined minority business enterprise as:
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Court erased any doubts about the constitutionality of affirmative action
programs by upholding the set-aside program. 48
Although the Court in Fidlilove noted that Congress had supplied an
abundance of evidence showing past discrimination, in fact there was very little
real evidence to justify the minority set-aside program, suggesting that
Congress need only summarily conclude that there was past discrimination in
order to justify an affirmative action plan.49 Fidlilove also did not clearly
establish the level of scrutiny to be applied in affirmative action cases. In Chief
Justice Burger's plurality opinion, he used "rational basis" or low level
scrutiny language to justify the plan, indicating a willingness to defer to
Congress in situations in which the federal government voluntarily decides to
initiate a program to redress past discriminatory practices in federal
contracting.50 On the other hand, Justice Marshall advocated the use of a more
intermediate level of scrutiny, using language such as "substantially related" to
governmental interests. 5 1
The Supreme Court further developed the notion that entities, other than
Congress, seeking to adopt affirmative action plans must make findings of past
discrimination to particular individuals in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts.52 Stotts, which occurred in Memphis, Tennessee, involved a consent
decree that purported to remedy the deficiencies in the fire department's hiring
a business at least 50 [percent] of which is owned by minority group members or, in
case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 [percentl of the stock of which is owned
by minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority
group members are citizens of the United States who are [African-American, Hispanic,
Asian, Native American], Eskimos, and Aleuts.
i at 454 (quoting Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 92 U.S.C.
§ 6701 et. seq.).
48 See TRIBE, supra note 27, at 1533.
49 See id. at 1534. The evidence which was supplied came from past hearings on other
legislation, 448 U.S. at 465-66. Furthermore, none of the evidence was actually mentioned
or debated on the House or Senate floors and no specific hearings on the set-aside were ever
held, 448 U.S. at 549-50 & n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Drew S. Days, Fulilove, 96
YALE L. J. 453, 465 (1987) (stating that "[o]ne can only marvel at the fact that the minority
set-aside provision [in Fulfilove] was enacted into law without hearings or committee
reports, and with only token opposition").
50 448 U.S. at 475. Justice Powell, however, employed the rational basis test, citing
the Commerce Clause (article I, § 8, cl. 3) as authority for Congress to justify the program.
51 Id. at 519 (Marshall, I., concurring). Justice Marshall's advocacy for the use of an
intermediate level of scrutiny for racial classifications which advantage racial minorities
served as an early attempt to establish a principled and rational method for dealing with
affirmative action cases.
52 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
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and promotion policies with respect to the employment of Blacks. 53 The city of
Memphis adopted a plan to increase the number of Blacks in each job
classification within the department until minority representation equalled the
proportion of Blacks in the labor force for the surrounding area.54 When the
city ran into financial difficulties, it began to lay off all nonessential personnel
under its seniority scheme of "last-hired, first-fired," including employees in
the fire department.55 Since the federal district court retained jurisdiction in
order to enforce the decree, the court enjoined the city from laying off any
black employees. The labor union representing the firefighters appealed,
arguing that the district court's actions violated section 706(g) of Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The Supreme Court held that in discharge cases, mere membership in a
disadvantaged class is insufficient to warrant a seniority award, stating that
each individual must prove that any discriminatory practice by a governmental
entity had an impact on him as an individual. 56 The Court reasoned that since
there was no finding that any of the protected blacks had been victims of
discrimination personally and since the consent decree failed to identify any
specific employee entitled to relief, the district court's injunction protecting
newly hired blacks violated section 706(g).57
In 1986 the Court handed down a trilogy of cases which addressed the
issue of how much statistical under-representation is needed to justify
affirmative action and what level of scrutiny should be used in deciding reverse
discrimination cases. 58 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education59 was probably
the most important case of the trilogy because it provided the fundamental
framework from which the Court would analyze future affirmative action cases.
In Wygant, white school teachers challenged the constitutionality of a
provision in their collective bargaining agreement which extended preferential
53 Id. at 565. The consent decree involved two Memphis firefighters who agreed to
drop their class action suits after the city agreed to take the necessary steps in order to
remedy past discriminatory hiring and promotional practices. The consent decree is binding
on both parties and has the full force of law. See BLAcK's LAw DIcrIoNARY 370 (5th ed.
1979).
54 467 U.S. at 565. The surrounding area included Shelby County. For example, if
Shelby County had a minority population of 20%, the department would attempt to increase
the number of minority lieutenants in the department until 20% of all lieutenants were
minority employees.
5 5 Id.
56 Id. at 579 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977)).57 Id.
58 Local 28 of the Int'l Assoc. of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986); Local No. 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
59 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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protection against economic layoffs to certain minority employees.60 By a
plurality decision, the Supreme Court found that the school board's policy of
extending preferential protection against layoffs to minority employees based
on race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 61
In support of its judgment, the Court held that racial classifications which
advantage minorities must be justified by a compelling state purpose and the
means chosen by the state to effectuate that purpose should be "narrowly
tailored." 62 The Court also held that societal discrimination alone is insufficient
to justify a benign racial classification. The Court reasoned that there must be
convincing evidence of past discrimination before benign racial classifications
are allowed. 63 Furthermore, the state must make a factual determination to
provide the necessary evidence of past discrimination. 64 The need for a
compelling state interest coupled with the requirement of a factual
determination showing past discrimination indicates the Court's movement
toward using a strict scrutiny analysis in affirmative action cases.
In Local 28 of the International Association of Sheet Metal Workers v.
EEOC,65 the Supreme Court acknowledged the district court's discretion in
ordering affirmative action, even numerical quotas, where employers engaged
in flagrant and persistent discrimination. Sheet Metal Workers involved a union
which defiantly resisted numerous orders to accept black apprentices and to
admit qualified Blacks as union members. 66 Responding to the union's
determination to discriminate, the Court for the first time ordered an employer
to adopt an affirmative action plan which would deny benefits to whites seeking
admission into the union yet extend them to minorities who had never been the
victims of discrimination. In a divided opinion, the Court held that district
courts have the power to order affirmative action in hiring or union
membership cases when necessary to counteract "egregious" discrimination. 67
This power to order affirmative action, however, is tempered by statements that
the plan in Sheet Metal Workers placed "marginal" and "temporary" burdens
on whites and that, because no discharges were involved, it "did not
60 l at 272.
6 1 Id. at 284.
62 Id. at 280 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980)).
63 Id. at 277.
64 Id.
65 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
66 See also BNA, supra note 14, at 30. The union was first cited for discrimination in
1964 by state authorities. In 1975, a federal district court found the union guilty of
discrimination and appointed an administrator who proposed an affirmative action plan
which set a goal of 29 % minority union membership which the court accepted. 478 U.S. at
426-32. The union was then cited for contempt for not complying with the court order in
1982 and 1983. Id. at 426.
67 Id. at 445.
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disadvantage existing union members." 68 The Court placed additional restraints
on district courts by indicating that court-ordered affirmative action plans must
be flexible in order to allow for "legitimate" excuses and time for reasonable
compliance. 69
Despite the Court's unwillingness to give district courts the unfettered
ability to order affirmative action, it nevertheless reaffirmed this power in
United States v. Paradise.70 Just as the union in Sheet Metal Workers71 defied
numerous court orders to discontinue discriminatory hiring practices, the
Alabama state police department also continued to discriminate against black
state troopers when giving promotions, despite court orders mandating that the
department alter its practices.72 In response, the district court in Alabama
imposed a numerical affirmative action plan which required the Alabama state
police to promote one black trooper for every white trooper promoted until a
given rank was twenty-five percent black or until the department implemented
an acceptable promotion plan.73
In determining the constitutionality of the judicially imposed plan, the
Supreme Court looked to five factors: (1) The necessity for the relief; (2) the
efficacy of alternative remedies; (3) the flexibility and the duration of the relief;
(4) the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and (5)
the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties. 74 After applying these
factors, a plurality of the Court found that the court-ordered plan did "not
disproportionately harm the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of
innocent individuals." 75 Moreover, the plan was flexible in its application, so
the Court held that it was constitutionally permissible.76
The third case of the 1986 trilogy did no more to shed light on what level
of scrutiny the Court would consistently apply in all affirmative action cases.
6 8 Id. at 481.
69 Id. at 478. See TRIBE, supra note 27, at 1539-40.
70 480 US. 149 (1987).
71 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
72 There was substantial litigation prior to the instant case. In 1972, the district court
issued an order enjoining the department to hire one black trooper for each white trooper
until blacks constituted 25% of the force. In 1975, the district court found that the
"defendants have, for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to the
plaintiff[s]. ... artificially restricted the size of the trooper force and the number of new
troopers hired." In 1979 and again in 1981 the department agreed to two consent decrees.
Finally, in 1983 the plaintiffs returned to the district court to enforce the 1979 and 1981
decrees. 480 U.S. 154-64 (quoting Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD
Ala.), Aug. 5, 1975).
73 Id. at 155. The plan specified that 50% of all department promotions were to go to
Blacks.
74Id. at 171.
75 Id. at 183.
76 Id at 185.
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Local Nwnber 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of
aevelandP involved the constitutionality of a consent decree to an affirmative
action plan which provided black and Hispanic firefighters hiring, assignment,
and promotion preferences over white firefighters. 78 Since the city of Cleveland
had previously been sued for discrimination in its police and fire departments,
and lost, the city decided to consent to an affirmative action plan rather than
risk the real possibility of losing in further litigation. The firefighters' union
challenged the consent decree on the grounds that it was an impermissible
remedy under section 706(g) of Title VII.79 In a narrow decision, the Court
held that section 706(g) did not prohibit an employer from voluntarily entering
into a consent decree to adopt an affirmative action plan.
In 1987, the Court reaffirmed its willingness to approve voluntary
affirmative action plans in Johnson v. Transportation Agency.80 Johnson
involved a female county transportation agency road dispatcher who was
promoted over a subjectively more qualified male applicant under the county's
voluntary affirmative action plan. 81 Recognizing that women have historically
been excluded from many technical and skilled craft jobs, the county adopted a
hiring and promotion plan which had a work force goal in which the number of
women, minority, and handicapped employees in the county would mirror the
proportional representation of each group in the county labor market.82 The
petitioner, a white male competing for the same dispatcher position, sued the
county, arguing that he had been unlawfully discriminated against under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The Supreme Court upheld the plan, supporting the county's justification
for the plan. The Court held that Title VII is no bar to the promotion of a
female applicant over a male who scored two points higher on a subjective
interview if the employer decides that such a promotion is justified, given the
fact that all of the 238 positions had previously been held by men. 83 The Court
stated that in order to justify an affirmative action plan, an employer need only
77 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
78 Just as in Sheet Metal Workers, the black and hispanic firefighters themselves were
not actual victims of discrimination.
79 See supra note 24.
80 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
81 Out of a total of twelve applicants, nine were deemed qualified for the job. Id. at
623. An interview was conducted, and seven out of the nine qualified applicants were
certified as eligible. Id. As a result of the first interview, the petitioner Johnson scored
seventy-five and the female applicant scored seventy-three. After a second interview,
Johnson was recommended for the job, but the director of the agency chose the female
applicant over Johnson, citing the affirmative action goals as a major consideration. Id. at
624-25.
82 See BNA, supra note 14, at 75.
83 480 U.S. at 641-42.
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point to a "'manifest imbalance' that reflected under-representation of women
in 'traditionally segregated job categories.' 84 The Court further stated that a
"manifest imbalance" in an employer's labor force can be shown by comparing
the percentages of women and minorities in skilled job categories with their
percentages in the qualified labor force.85 Although the county's plan did not
actually show that it, as an agency, had discriminated against women, it did
show traditional under-representation in certain job classifications and the
difficulty in increasing female representation. The county felt, and the Court
agreed, that traditional under-representation dictated the need for such a plan,
thereby satisfying the Court's requirement of a showing of "manifest
imbalance." 86
C. Status ofAffirnative Action Before Croson-What Level of Review?
Affirmative action jurisprudence from the 1970s until 1987 developed
along two major lines of cases. 87 One line of cases involved Title VII
discrimination challenges to affirmative action programs adopted by private-
sector employers and unions. 88 The other involved constitutional equal
protection challenges to affirmative action programs initiated by governmental
entities. 89 The two lines of cases developed different standards of evaluation. 90
84 Id. at 631 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197
(1979)).
85 Id. at 631-32. If the job does not require any special skills, then the relevant
comparison is with the percentage of minorities or women in the area labor market or in the
general population. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 1542 n.109.
86 480 U.S. at 637.
87 See Jill B. Scott, Note, Will the Supreme Court Conanue To Put Aside Local
Government Set-Asides as Unconstitutional?: The Search for an Answer in City of
Richmond v. I.A. Croson Co., 42 BAYLORL. REv. 197, 199-200 (1990).
88 See, e.g. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n. v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
89 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
90 See Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond. Affinnative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MicH. L. REV. 1729, 1737 n.40 (1989) (Rosenfeld
suggests there is substantial overlap between the relevant statutory and constitutional criteria
in the case of public employers). See also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
649 (1987) (O'Connor, I., concurring in judgment) (Justice O'Connor rejects the
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On the one hand, the Fourteenth Amendment cases used a strict scrutiny
analysis under which the governmental entity's use of racial classifications in
affirmative action programs must be justified by a "compelling governmental
interest" 91 and the means chosen by that governmental entity to effectuate that
purpose must be "narrowly tailored." 92 In other words, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the governmental entity must make a factual determination
providing statistical evidence of past discrimination and impose a remedy which
is specifically tied to the past discrimination. Under Title VII, however, the
private employer must show a "manifest imbalance" resulting in an under-
representation. 93 The strict scrutiny standard carries a higher burden of proof
than simply showing a "manifest imbalance."
Under strict scrutiny, plaintiffs must provide clear and convincing evidence
of past discrimination in order to adopt a constitutionally permissible
affirmative action program; whereas, in order to show a manifest imbalance,
plaintiffs have to prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
Therefore, plaintiffs must prove more when arguing under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause than under Title VII. The Court did not
decide the level of scrutiny required in all equal protection cases until Croson.
Although the level of scrutiny the Court required for equal protection cases
had not been definitively established prior to Croson, two distinct positions had
emerged. 94 The first position advocates the use of strict scrutiny for equal
protection analysis of all affirmative action cases. This position was first
advanced by Justice Powell in Bakke95 and gained considerable momentum
during the latter part of the 1980s.9 6 The second position calls for a lower or
proposition of any divergence between statutory and constitutional analysis of affirmative
action cases). Cf. David D. Meyer, Note, Finding a "Manifest Imbalance": The Case for a
Unified Statistical Test for Voluntary Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 87 MCH. L. REV.
1986, 1992-94 (1989) (author suggests that the evidentiary standards for Title VII are lower
than those for the Fourteenth Amendment).
91 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (quoting Palmora v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
92 Id. at 274 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980)).
93 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637 (1987). See supra notes 83-
86 and accompanying text.
94 See Rosenfeld, supra note 90, at 1735.
95 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
96 Justice Powell interpreted equal protection as requiring that the same protection be
given to every person regardless of race. Id. at 269-320. See Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561 (1984). See also Rosenfeld, supra note 90, at 1735, 1738.
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intermediate level of scrutiny. 97 Cases such as Wygant, Johnson, and Paradise
forecast the inevitable adoption of the more stringent strict scrutiny analysis for
governmental agencies other than Congress.
IV. CITY OF RICHMOND V. J.A. CROSON Co.
In 1983, the Richmond City Council enacted an ordinance known as the
Minority Business Utilization Plan (Richmond Plan), which required prime
contractors who were awarded city contracts to set aside thirty percent of those
contracts to Minority Business Enterprises (IBEs). 98 The Richmond Plan was
identical to the plan adopted by the Federal Government in Fullilove, which
authorized the director of the Department of General Services to promulgate
rules permitting the director to waive the set-aside requirements if the prime
contractor demonstrated that the requirement could not be satisfied. 99
Under Richmond's purchasing procedures, the plan required lowest bid
contractors to submit forms on which the contractor identified MBEs they
intended to hire and indicated the total percentage of the contract price that
would be paid to each MBE.1 °° Once these forms were completed, contractors
forwarded them to the city's Human Resources Commission, which verified the
MBE information.101 The director made the final determination concerning
compliance.02
The city of Richmond adopted the plan after a public hearing revealed a
pattern of discrimination in the Richmond construction industry. The city relied
on a number of factors to support the plan. First, the hearing revealed that
fewer than one percent of the city's prime construction contracts had been
awarded to MBEs from 1978 to 1983, although Richmond's population is fifty
97 Although no cases state the intermediate level as the appropriate standard of review,
a minority of Justices, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, appeared to have held this view.
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Marshall, I, concurring).
98 City of Richmond v. l.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 477-78. The Court noted that
the Richmond Plan defined MBEs as businesses that were at least 51% owned or controlled
by Blacks, Spanish-speaking persons, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts. Id. at 478.
This definition mirrored the definition contained in the Federal Government's set-aside
program in Fullilove. The Court also noted that there was no geographic limit to the
Richmond Plan and an otherwise qualified MBE from anywhere in the United States could
avail itself of the Richmond set aside. l.
99 Id. at 478.
10l Id. at 479.
101 Id. If a contractor requested a waiver, then this request would also be forwarded to
the Commission, which in turn made a recommendation concerning the request.
102 Id. The director's decision was unappealable. However, if a contract was awarded
to another bidder after a finding of non-compliance, the unsuccessful bidder could protest
under Richmond's procurement regulations. Id.
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percent black.103 Second, statistical evidence indicated that minorities had
negligible representation in state and local trade associations. 104 Third,
Congress had made nationwide findings of discrimination in the construction
industry. Finally, two persons testified to the existence of discrimination in the
construction industry.' 0 5 No direct evidence of discrimination was offered by
the city.16
During September of 1983, the J.A. Croson Company submitted a bid for
the installation of stainless steel urinals and water closets for the city jail. 0 7
Croson determined that compliance required subcontracting the installation of
the fixtures, thus it attempted to locate an eligible MBE.10° After failing to
locate a MBE who could install the fixtures at a reasonable price, Croson
applied for a waiver to the set-aside requirement, which was denied.10 9 After
being denied a waiver and subsequently losing its bid for the city jail project,
Croson sued the city of Richmond, alleging that the Richmond Plan violated its
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the laws.
The U.S. District Court upheld the plan, and the U.S. Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court granted Croson's
writ of certiorari and vacated and remanded the decision to the court of appeals
for further consideration using Wygant's more stringent strict scrutiny standard
of review.110 On remand, the court of appeals found that the Richmond Plan
violated the Equal Protection Clause, holding that the plan was not justified by
a "compelling governmental interest" since the record showed no prior
discrimination by the city and since the thirty percent set-aside was not
"narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose."111
In a deeply divided opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals decision, thereby striking down the Richmond Plan. Although the
Justices disagreed on what level of review to impose, six agreed that the plan
was unconstitutional.' 12 On the crucial question of what level of scrutiny to
apply, Justice O'Connor wrote for a plurality of four to five in Part three A of
103 Id.
104 Id. at 480.
105 Id. at 479.
106 Id. at 480.
107 Id. at 481.
108 Id. at 481-82.
109 d at 483.
110 Id. at 485. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
111 Id. at 485-86.
112 Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion with Justices Rehnquist and White joining in all
parts and with Justices Stevens and Kennedy joining in parts I, IIIB, and IV. Id. at 475.
Justice Kennedy joined O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White in parts IA and V. Id. Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, and Scalia wrote concurring opinions while Justice Marshall wrote the
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Id. at 511,518, 520, 528.
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her opinion, calling for strict scrutiny in equal protection challenges to all
affirmative action cases." 13
A. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
Justice O'Connor's opinion contains six parts to which various justices
joined. She only received a majority, however, in Parts one, three B, and four
and a plurality in Parts three A and five. The persistent questions pertaining to
what level of scrutiny the Supreme Court will employ and what must be proven
in order to adopt a permissible affirmative action plan are answered in Parts
three A and three B, respectively.
1. Proper Level of Scrutiny
In Part three A, Justice O'Connor clearly establishes the strict scrutiny test
as the appropriate level of review for race-conscious classifications adopted by
governmental entities in affirmative action cases. 1 4 The strict scrutiny test is a
two-pronged test. The first prong requires affirmative action programs based
on racial classifications to be justified by a "compelling governmental
interest." 115 The second prong requires that the governmental entity choose a
means to effectuate its purpose which is narrowly tailored to achieve that
goal. 116 Justice O'Connor cited Justice Powell from both Bakke and Wygant,
which reject societal discrimination as a basis for showing a compelling
interest. 117 Therefore, under the first prong of the test, governmental entities
that wish to adopt minority set-aside programs, or any other types of
affirmative action, must make factual showings of prior discrimination in order
to show a compelling state interest. 118 Moreover, the second prong of the test
requires that the means chosen to redress the past discrimination must not be
"chosen arbitrarily," 119 but must be "tied to the number of minority
subcontractors in Richmond or to any other relevant number." 120 Justice
O'Connor describes in Part three B what types of factual determinations are
sufficient to show a compelling state interest.
113 Id. at 493. Justice O'Connor wrote part LIA, which applies strict scrutiny, with
Justices Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy joining.
114 Id. at 493-98.
115 See Ud at 485. See also supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
116 See i at 485. See also supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
117 488 U.S. at 496-97.
1 18 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
119 J.A. Croson Co. v. Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1360 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (Croson I).
120 Id.
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2. Proper Statistical Comparisons
In Part three B, Justice O'Connor rejects the district court's basis for
upholding the Richmond set-aside program, stating that, "[nione of these
'findings,' singly or together, provide the City of Richmond with a 'strong
basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.'' 121
Justice O'Connor firmly rejects the following justifications for upholding
minority set-asides: (1) Mere fact that the program advantages rather than
disadvantages racial minorities; 122 (2) generalized assertions of past
discriminatory practices; 123 (3) statistical comparisons between the number of
prime contracts awarded to minority firms and minority populations within the
governmental entity's jurisdiction; 124 (4) low membership of minority firms in
local contractors' associatios; 125 and (5) congressional findings of past
discrimination. 126 More importantly, however, Justice O'Connor suggests the
types of statistical comparisons which the Court would approve. In particular,
she points to the types of statistical comparisons used in employment
discrimination cases such as Hazelwood School District v. United States'27 and
in public contracting cases such as Ohio Contractors Association v. Kelp.128
Although Justice O'Connor did not specifically endorse any particular statistical
method for showing prior discrimination, her reference to the methods used in
Hazelwood and Ohio Contractors suggest at least one acceptable method.
121 488 U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277). The district court relied on
five factors in upholding the set-aside:
1) the ordinance declares itself to be remedial; 2) several proponents of the measure
stated their views that there had been past discrimination in the construction industry; 3)
minority businesses received .67% of prime contracts from the city while minorities
constituted 50% of the city's population; 4) there were very few minority contractors in
local and state contractors' associations; and 5) in 1977, Congress made a determination
that the effects of past discrimination had stifled minority participation in the
construction industry nationally.
488 U.S. at 499.
122 Id. at 500.
123 Id.
12 4 Id. at 501.
125 Id. at 503.
126 Id. at 504.
127 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (proper comparison was between the racial composition of
Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school teacher
population in the relevant labor market).
128 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983) (comparing percentage of minority businesses in the
state to percentage of contracts awarded to minority contractors).
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In Hazelwood, the United States Government brought an action against the
Hazelwood, Missouri School District, 129 alleging that it had engaged in a
"pattern or practice" of teacher employment discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.130 The government sought to prove a
"pattern or practice" of discrimination by adducing evidence of: (1) A history
of discrimination; (2) statistical disparities in hiring; (3) very subjective hiring
procedures; and (4) specific instances of alleged discrimination against fifty-five
unsuccessful black applicants for teaching jobs. 131 The district court found that
the above evidence submitted by the government failed to establish a pattern or
practice of discrimination. The court of appeals, however, reversed in part on
the grounds that the district court's statistical analysis of hiring data rested on
an "irrelevant comparison of [black] teachers to [black] pupils in
Hazelwood." 132 The court of appeals stated that the proper comparison was
between the racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial
composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant
labor market. 133
From 1972 to 1973, only 1.4 percent of Hazelwood's teachers were Black.
During the following school year only 1.8 percent of the teachers were Black
while 15.4 percent of St. Louis' metropolitan area teachers were Black. The
court of appeals held that this statistical disparity constituted, prima facie, a
pattern or practice of racial discrimination. 134 The Supreme Court agreed with
the court of appeals' statistical comparisons, but held that it erred in
disregarding the possibility that the prima facie statistical proof in the record
might, at the trial court level, be rebutted by pre-amendment hiring
statistics. 135 The Supreme Court explained that once a prima facie case has
been established by statistical workforce disparities, the employer must be
given an opportunity to show that the claimed discriminatory pattern is a
product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination. 136
Since the court of appeals did not give the Hazelwood school district an
129 The Hazelwood school district is located in northern St. Louis County, Missouri
and covers 78 square miles. 433 U.S. at 301.
130 433 U.S. at 301. Title VII was amended on March 24, 1972, making it applicable
to public employers.
131 433 U.S. at 303.
132 Id. at 305.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 309. In other words, the school district might be able to show that the 1972-
1974 statistical disparities might be a result of discrimination not prohibited by Title VII
until it was applicable to public employers in 1972.
136 Id. at 309-10. Since Title VII did not apply to public employers before 1972, any
discrimination which occurred prior to 1972 would have to be challenged on equal
protection grounds.
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opportunity to show whether the disparities were due to pre- or post-Act hiring
practices, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to
determine the origins of the statistical disparities. Despite remanding the case
for further determinations, however, the Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit's
holding that the proper comparison was between the racial composition of the
teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school teacher
population in the relevant labor market. 137
The Eighth Circuit's statistical comparison was also adopted by the Sixth
Circuit in Ohio Contractors Association v. Kelp, 138 which Justice O'Connor
also cited as an appropriate comparison. 139 In Ohio Contractors, an association
of contractors and several individual white contractors sought a declaratory
judgement that Ohio's minority set-aside statute was unconstitutional. The U.S.
District Court found that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. The Sixth Circuit found that the set-aside statute was
adopted against a "backdrop" from which members of the Ohio legislature
were informed of discriminatory practices against minority contractors. 1 4 A
primary factor in this "backdrop" was a report submitted by a special task
force established by the Ohio Attorney General which found severe numerical
imbalances in the number of contracts awarded to minority firms. The report
stated that during the years 1975 to 1977, minority firms constituted seven
percent of all Ohio businesses but received fewer than one half of one percent
of state contracts. 141 This comparison between the total number of contracts
awarded to minority firms and the total number of eligible minority firms in
Ohio was an appropriate and proper comparison to show statistical disparities
according to the Sixth Circuit in Ohio Contractors.
The lesson from Hazelwood and Ohio Contractors is that an inference of
discriminatory exclusion can arise when there is a significant statistical
disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able
to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors that the
locality, directly or indirectly, actually engages. 142 Moreover, both of these
cases unequivocally demonstrate that the proper statistical comparison in
showing imbalances or disparities is the total percentage of contracting dollars
going to minority firms compared to the total percentage of available minority
firms in the market. 143
13 7 Id.
138 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983).
139 488 U.S. at 502.
140 713 F.2d at 171.
141 Id.
14 2 Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
143 See Columbus, Ohio Disparity Study and Recommendations by law firm of Beatty
& Roseboro (233 South High Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215) [hereinafter Beatty &
[Vol. 53:555
PERMISSIBLE MINORITY SET-ASIDE
3. State and Municipal Remedies for Identified Discrimination
In Part Five of her opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasizes that Croson does
not preclude state and local entities from taking various forms of action to
rectify "identified" discrimination within its jurisdiction. 144 In fact, Justice
O'Connor states that "[w]here there is a significant statistical disparity between
the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a
particular service and the number of such contractors actually engaged by the
locality or the locality's prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory
exclusion could arise." 145 In such circumstances, governmental entities seem to
have a number of ordered options to remedy the discriminatory practice. First,
Justice O'Connor suggests that local governmental entities always have at their
disposal "a whole array of race-neutral devices to increase the accessibility of
city contracting opportunities" to minority contractors when they are unable to
show past discrimination. 146 For example, in the absence of direct evidence of
discrimination, cities and states could: (1) Simplify bidding procedures; (2)
relax bonding requirements; (3) provide training and financial aid for
disadvantaged entrepreneurs; and (4) enact ordinances and statutes prohibiting
discrimination in providing credit or bonding by local suppliers and banks to
minority contractors. 147 According to Justice O'Connor, the theory behind
these types of "race-neutral" remedies is that many of the barriers to minority
contractors entering the government contracting process are products of
bureaucracy rather than discrimination, and by tearing down the barriers with
race-neutral remedies, new entrants, such as minority contractors, will gain
access to government contracts without relying on racial classifications.1 48
Second, governmental entities have the power to penalize individual
discriminators and provide appropriate relief to the victim of such
discrimination. 149 Thus, if the governmental entity can identify individual
instances of discrimination, they can remedy those instances without resorting
to racial classifications. Moreover, Justice O'Connor states, "evidence of a
pattern of individual discriminatory acts can, if supported by appropriate
Roseboro] (Beatty & Roseboro was commissioned to review the City of Columbus' minority
set-aside program and to provide the City with the evidence of past discrimination needed to
justify their program).
144 488 U.S. at 509.
145 Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 509-10.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 509.
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statistical proof, lend support to a local government's determination that
broader remedial relief is justifted."sO
The third level of remedial relief is reserved for those situations where
gross statistical disparities are shown. In these "extreme case[s]," Justice
O'Connor authorizes the use of "some form of narrowly tailored racial
preference . . . to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion." 151 Although
Justice O'Connor did not indicate what she meant by a "narrowly tailored
racial preference," certainly numerical quotas of public contracts for minority
contractors tied to identified statistical disparities would fit this description.
Therefore, if governmental entities can show gross statistical disparities using
proper findings, 152 and the relief is narrowly tailored to remedying the
disparity, then race-based minority set-asides should be constitutional. Justice
O'Connor suggests, however, that governmental entities must first determine
that race-neutral remedies would not succeed in remedying the identified gross
statistical disparities before adopting race-based remedies such as minority set-
asides.
V. ESTABLISHING THE REQUISITE EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL MINORITY SET-ASIDE PROGRAM
A. Statistical Evidence
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson firmly established that proper statistical
evidence can be used by a legislative body to draw a prima facie inference of
discriminatory intent.1 53 The Supreme Court has stated that if governmental
entities compare the total percentage of contracting dollars going to minority
contractors to the total percentage of eligible minority contractors in the market
and if a significant disparity can be shown from these comparisons, then such
an inference can be drawn. In order for local governments to draw an inference
of discrimination, they must first determine whether any discrimination is
occurring within its contract awarding apparatus. Local governments can
determine if discrimination is occuring by comparing the amount of contracts
awarded to minority contractors with the amount that would be expected if
awards were randomly awarded to both minority and non-minority
contractors.154 If the amount of contracts awarded to minority contractors is
150 Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
151 Id.
152 See supra Part IV(a)(2).
153 See supra Part IV(a)(2) and (3).
154 Statistical formulations were gathered from numerous interviews held ian.-Feb.
1992 with Robert Leighty, statistician and manager of the Statistical Consulting Service at
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less than the amount that would be expected, provided the contracts were
randomly awarded, then local governments are presented with a prima facie
inference of discrimination. This theory can be expressed as follows:
If y < (n)(p) then prima facie inference of discrimination
Where:
1. y = amount received by minority contractors;
2. n = the total amount of government payments awarded in contracts over the
time period: n = E ni;
3. ni = the dollar amount of the i'th contract, i = 1, 2,... k;
4. po = MBE F / CITY F;
5. MBE F= number of eligible minority firms within the governmental
jurisdiction;
6. CITY F = total number of minority and non-minority firms within the
government's jurisdiction. 155
Realistically, governmental entities do not randomly award contracts. In
fact, a certain amount of bias in the selection process can be expected. 156 For
example, suppose a public servant is presented with bids from contractors A
and B to build a new fire station. Both A and B have submitted comparable
bids, and both are capable of building a safe and aesthetic fire station on time.
The public servant might choose A over B simply because the servant thinks A
is a better contractor. The decision was made purely from a subjective belief
that A is a better contractor than B. In order to distinguish between situations
when public servants select contractors based on normal subjective bias or
other non-discriminatory factors and outright racial discrimination,
governmental entities need to know at what point any inference of
discrimination becomes statistically significant.
In Castaneda v. Parida,157 the Supreme Court provided cities and states
with a rational method for determining when evidence of discrimination is
the Ohio State University, 131 Cockins Hall, 1958 Neil Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210
[hereinafter Leighty].
155 Id. See also Beatty & Roseboro, supra note 144, at 15. See also Disparity in Public
Contracting, Columbus, Ohio, Economic Evidence and Recommendations by William D.
Bradford (Professor of Finance, College of Business and Management, University of
Maryland, College Park) at 2-4 (Tan. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Professor Bradford] (Report
given to Beatty & Roseboro on the methodology of economic evidence needed to justify a
minority set-aside program); Andrew F. Brimmer & Ray Marshall, Racial Discrimination
and business Enterprise Activity: Measurement of Participation and Utilization 2 (June 29,
1990) [hereinafter Brimmer & Marshall] (Report given to City of Atlanta to justify its
minority set-aside program).156 Professor Bradford, supra note 155, at 8.
157 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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statistically significant.158 As a general rule, if there are more than three
standard deviations for the binomial distribution 59 between the amount of
contract dollars that minority firms should be expected to receive and the actual
amount of contract dollars they received, then the disparity is a result of
something other than the expected fluctuation due to normal bias. 160
Once a local government has a prima facie inference of discrimination, it
could develop a Standard Deviation Quotient which would help governments
determine whether any inference of discrimination is statistically significant,
Le., whether it has a prima facie case of discrimination. The Standard
Deviation Quotient can be expressed as:
Standard Deviation Quotient = - (Y - (n)(po)) / SE(Y) 161
Where:
1. Y = the amount received by minority contractors;
2. n = the total amount of government payments awarded in contracts over the
timeperiod: n = Eni
3. ni the dollar amount of the i'th contract, i = 1, 2.... k;
4. po MBE F / CITY F;
5. MBE F = number of eligible minority firms within the governmental
jurisdiciton;
6. CITY F = total number of minority and non-minority firms within the
government's jurisdiction;
7. SE(Y) = (po (1-po) E ni2).hA
By comparing the Standard Deviation Quotient with the value three, local
governments can test whether they have a prima facie case of discrimination.
The Standard Deviation Quotient test suggests that the probability of a minority
contractor receiving a contract award is very small if the Standard Deviation
Quotient exceeds the value three. 162 If the probability of a minority contractor
158 IL. at 496-97 n.17 (binomial distribution method used by Court to show racial
disparity injury selection). See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 309, 311 nn.14, 17.
159 See Michel 0. Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the
Jwy Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338, 353-56 (1966); Professor Bradford,
supra note 155, at 4-8.
160 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17. See also Professor Bradford, supra note 154, at 3-4.
161 Leighty, supra note 154.
162 The comparison of the Standard Deviation Quotient with the value 3 is actually an
hypothesis test on the parameter p, the probability that a minority contractor is awarded a
contract. This statistical test is designed to determine if the probability p is less than the
probability po, the proportion of eligible minority contractors. Local governments are
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receiving a contract award is less than the eligibility ratio, defined to be the
proportion of eligible minority contrictors, then local governnments are
presented with prima facie evidence of discrimination which is statistically
significant. This hypothesis test can be expressed as:
If the Standard Deviation Quotient > 3 then p will be very small
If p = po then city is awarding contracts impartially
If p < po then city is awarding contracts discriminatorally
Where:
1. Standard Deviation Quotient = -(Y - (n)(po)) / SE(Y); 16 3
2. p = probability that a minority contractor is awarded a contract;
3. po = MIBE F / CITY F;
4. MBE F = number of eligible minority firms within the government's
jurisdiction;
5. CITY F = total number of minority and non-minority firms within the
govemment's jurisdiction. 164
A Standard Deviation Quotient that exceeds three suggests that
discrimination is being practiced, but it does not shed any insight into the
severity of the discrimination being practiced. 165 For example, an instance in
which p (the probability that a minority contractor is awarded a contract) is 20
percent smaller than Po (the proportion of eligible minority contractors) would
presumedly be considered more serious than an instance in which p is only 5
percent smaller than po. In order to determine the severity of discrimination, a
confidence interval could be constructed which would allow courts to measure
the severity of a city's prima facie case of discrimination. This confidence
interval can be expressed as:
[ 2P+ -'c(c2 +4 ) , 2p+c2+c(c2+ 4 I)' h
2(1 + c2) 2(1 + c2) j
alternative hypothesis of a possible discriminatory policy in awarding contracts, HI:p = po.
Leighty, supra note 134.
163 For a detailed description of all variales which make up the Standard Deviation
Quotient equation, see supra Standard Deviation Quotient note 156 and accompanying text.
164 Leighty, supra note 154.
165 Id.
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Where:
1. p = the proportion of dollars awarded to minority contractors over the
time period: p = Y/n;
2. Y = the amount received by minority contractors;
3. n = the total amount of government payments awarded in contracts over
the time period: n = E ni;
4. ni = the dollar amount of the i'th contract, i = 1, 2,... k;
5. =l-j,
6. c = zoe/2 ( ni2/n)'h;
7. zoe/2 = the upper oc /2 percentile of the standard normal distribution. 166
For example, in Case 1, if a city awards 500 contracts each amounting to
$10,000 and the proportion of dollars awarded to minority contractors over a
time period is .23 (p = .23), the confidence interval equation gives an interval
of (.18, .29) or 18 percent to 29 percent. If p (the probability that a minority
contractor is awarded a contract) is 30 percent, then the city is not presented
with a very serious case of discrimination. If in Case 2, however, given the
same facts as in Case 1 except p equals .07, then the confidence interval
equation gives an interval of (.04, .11) or 4 percent to 11 percent, which is
nowhere near 30 percent. Therefore, the city in Case 2 is presented with a very
egregious prima facie case of discrimination.
The only major criticism of this confidence interval is that it gives a very
large confidence interval for small numbers of contracts. In such instances a
city may not have an accurate indication of the severity of the discrimination
which is occurring. In order to obtain a more accurate confidence interval, a
city must have a substantial history of awarding contracts. The more contracts a
city awards, the more reliable the confidence interval will be. 167
Challengers who attack state and local governments who institute minority
set-aside programs based on statistical disparities and the Standard Deviation
Quotient168 may argue that this methodology does not account for the many
variables that go into deciding whether to award a contract or not. They may
argue that lack of bonding or lack of experience in contracting may be the
cause of the disparity rather than discrimination. Such an argument is a
powerful one, particularly when the Standard Deviation Quotient is close to
three. In cases in which the Standard Deviation Quotient is rather high, it is
unlikely that factors such as lack of bonding or experience alone account for
166 Id., THOMAS i. SANTER & DIANE E. DUFFY, THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
DISCRErEDATA41 (1989).167 Leighty, supra note 154.
168 See upra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
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such a large disparity. In cases in which the Standard Deviation Quotient is
close to three, state and local governments could adopt other statistical
methodologies which account for explanatory variables such as bonding and
experience. For example, local governments could use chi-square testing169 or
multiple regression as a method to infer discrimination. 170
Multiple regression is a technique that has increasingly been used by courts
to infer discrimination because of its ability to determine what factors are
involved in a particular setting and the weight of their involvement. 171 Multiple
Regression allows one to compare the influence of many variables on the
awarding of contracts. By holding these factors constant, multiple regression
allows a local government to determine whether bonding or some other
influencing factor is a significant factor in awarding contracts. 172 A major
limitation of this technique is that the dependent variable against which other
factors are judged must be a continuous variable. 173
The dependent variable in public contracting cases could be a function of
the probability that a contract is awarded given several explanatory variables,
such as bonding and years of experience. This function could be expressed as
follows:
log r p(x) 1[ (1-p(x)) J =K+axl+bx2 +cx3 +dx4 +...+uxm
169 See DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN
LrrGATION 200-47 (1986); PiCHARD A. WEHMHOEFER, STATISTICS IN ImGATION 72-
85 (1985); DAVID W. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF 163-98 (1983).
170 The Standard Deviation Quotient is not the only method to infer discrimination,
however, it is the only method that Justice O'Connor alluded to in Croson. The literature is
filled with various statistical methods to infer discrimination. See e.g. BARNES & CONLEY,
supra note 169; WEHMHOEFER, supra note 169; BARNES, supra note 169; DAVID C.
BALDUS & 1. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980).
171 M JCHAEL . ZIMMER, Er. AL., EMPLOYMEN-r DISCRIMINATION 122-29 (1988).
Multiple regression was first suggested in employment discrimination contexts in Note,
Beyond the Prima Fade Case in Etnployent Discimination Law: Statistical Proof and
Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV 387 (1975). Since 1975, a number of federal courts, including
the Supreme Court, have considered multiple regression analysis. See, e.g. Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Hanson v. Veteran's Admin., 800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1986);
Griffin v. Board of Regents, 795 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1986); Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills,
Inc., 773 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1985); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir.
1985).
172 ZU&M, supra note 171 at 130.
173 l. Multiple regression is mostly used in pay discrimination cases in which salary is
the dependent variable. Bazemore, 478 U.S. 385; Hanson, 800 F.2d 1381; Griffin, 795
F.2d 1281; Lews, 773 F.2d 561; Coates, 756 F.2d 524.
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in which the left side of the equation represents the probability or odds of
awarding a contract and the right side represents the various factors such as
bonding or years of experience which will influence the awarding of
contracts. 174 The most difficult part of this methodology is determining which
variables should be included in the equation. If a local government is convinced
that it has included all of the relevant variables into the model, it will have to
gather the relevant data and apply it to the model. There are widely available
software packages that will allow for computer computations of the data. 175
Once this is done, local governments will be able to determine what variables
have a statistically significant influence on public contracting. If race is the
significant factor, then the local government has raised an inference of
discrimination.
Statistical models such as Standard Deviation Quotient and Multiple
Regression allow state and local governments to identify discrimination in their
public contracting apparatus. Governmental entities, however, should not rely
on statistical evidence alone. They should supplement statistical proof with
actual testimony of discrimination that will bring "cold numbers convincingly
to life." 176
B. Anecdotal Evidence
Anecdotal evidence is needed to corroborate the inference drawn from any
statistical disparities which are shown. If minority contractors testify that they
have been personally discriminated against while attempting to obtain contracts,
and other forms of proof are presented showing that minorities have been
discriminated against, it provides courts with the support needed to dispel any
notion that the disparity is due to anything but discrimination.
State and local governments have three methods to choose from to present
anecdotal evidence. 177 The first, and probably the best, requires governmental
entities to conduct public hearings in which minority and other contractors
testify to individual instances of discrimination that they have encountered with
the governmental entity. The second requires the entity to produce written
statements and affidavits of past discriminatory practices. Finally, local
governments could search the public record for vestiges of discrimination. 178
Past law suits, complaints, and newspaper articles alleging discrimination could
all be used to show that the governmental entity engaged in discrimination.
174 See DAvID R. Cox & E.J. SNELL, ANALYSIS OF BINARY DATA 104-06 (1970);
BARNEs & CONLEY, supra note 169, at 412.
175 A typical software package is Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
which will include regression programs that can be adapted for public contracting cases.
176 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977).
177 Beatty & Roseboro, supra note 143, at 17-25.
178 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Once local governments have collected statistical evidence indicating a
statistically significant disparity and they present anecdotal evidence supporting
the economic evidence, Croson permits government entities to adopt a minority
set-aside program. Croson also requires, however, that the set-aside be
narrowly tailored to correcting the disparity. This additional burden presents
local governments with the problem of determining exactly how narrowly
tailored the set-aside must be in order to be constitionally permissible.
VI. How "NARROWLY TAILORED"?
Although the Court in Croson required that any race-based remedy be
"narrowly tailored," 179 the Court does not provide any concrete examples of
what a narrowly tailored minority set-aside would look like. The Croson case
does, however, indicate that an acceptable set-aside program would not
"arbitrarily" choose goals or quotas.' 80 Justice O'Connor also states that the
purpose for the "narrowly tailored" element of strict scrutiny is designed to
"'ensur[e] that the means chosen "fit" [the] compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.'"' 8' Unfortunately, Croson provides
local governments with no objective standard to determine what is meant by
"narrowly tailored." One viable and reliable source is other equal protection
cases.
Basically, the Court has upheld race-based statutes which achieve the
purpose that they intend without providing remedies to individuals who were
not victims of discrimination and without providing victims with a windfall.' 82
Given this framework, local governments would have a narrowly tailored set-
aside if the quotas were: (1) Limited to the class which has been discriminated
against; and (2) limited to providing minority firms with the contracts they
would have received but for discrimination. Therefore, in order for numerical
quotas to be narrowly tailored, they should be tied to the amount that eligible
minority firms would expect to receive if no discrimination existed.' 83
From a practical point of view, local governments should set their
numerical quotas based on the gap between what minority firms would be
179 488 U.S. at 509.
180 Id. at 486.
181 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2997,
3037 (1990) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
182 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986).
183 See Professor Bradford, supra note 154, at 8.
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receiving if no discrimination existed, adjusted for explanatory factors, 184 and
the actual amount of contract dollars minority firms receive. For example, in
year one, it is determined that minority firms should be receiving ten percent of
the government's contract dollars based on the Standard Deviation Quotient;
however, due to discrimination, they are only receiving two percent of the
contract dollars. In this situation, the governmental entity should set a
numerical quota at eight percent in order to close the gap. If, in year two, the
amount minority firms should receive remains at ten percent but the amount
they actually receive increases from two percent to six percent, as a result of
the set-aside, then year three's numerical quota should be four percent. Each
year the government entity should set the numerical quotas based on the gap
between what minority firms should be receiving and what they actually
receive. Such a scheme allows for flexibility in the set-aside to allow for
improvements in contracting process and should be tailored narrowly enough to
satisfy Croson.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although City ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson may have made it more difficult
for state and local governments to enact statutes and ordinances establishing
minority set-aside programs, nothing in the decision suggests that all set-asides
are unconstitutional. Moreover, nothing in the decision suggests that
affirmative action is dead. In fact, the concept of affirmative action is alive and
well in the eyes of the Supreme Court. 185 In order for local governments to
adopt a constitutional minority set-aside program, they must follow the
guidelines set by Croson. If state and local governments wish to adopt minority
set-aside programs, they should take four steps to ensure their program
complies with the mandates of Croson.
First, they should establish that race-neutral remedies will not correct
discrimination in contract awarding. Second, they should provide legislatures
and city councils with concrete statistical evidence using the standard deviation
statistical method, or any other proven statistical method, to show that an
unexplained disparity exists between the amount of contract dollars non-
minority firms receive and what minority firms should be receiving if no
discrimination existed. Third, they should provide anecdotal evidence
corroborating the inference drawn from the results of the statistical evidence.
Finally, state and local governments should take care to set numerical goals in a
184 For example, if a disparity is greater than 3 standard deviations, then
discrimination is inferred.
185 See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S.
Ct. 2997 (1990) (FCC policy designed to enhance minority participation and ownership of
radio and television stations held constitutional).
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manner which allows for flexibility but also reduces the disparity between the
amount of contract dollars minority firms actually receive and what they ought
to be receiving. If local governments take great care to follow these steps, they
will have a blueprint for a constitutionally permissible minority set-aside
program.
These steps may seem easy enough to accomplish, but in reality the
Supreme Court has saddled many local governments with a tremendous burden
of proof, particularly given this country's historical treatment of African-
Americans. Local governments that wish to adopt minority set-aside programs
will face numerous practical problems which many governments will find
insurmountable. Some of these obstacles will include: Problems in defining
realistic geographic markets when determining eligible minority firms;
problems in figuring cost-effective ways to ascertain exactly how many contract
dollars are awarded to minority firms since most state and cities do not
routinely track such expenditures; and problems in persuading public officials
to admit that they have been discriminating against minority firms.
In the end, the Supreme Court may have deterred local governments that
are not determined and dedicated to rectifying the past ills of society, but those
governments that are committed, and which will provide the necessary
resources required to adopt permissible minority set-aside programs, should not
be deterred. Hope is still alive for those governments that desire to give
minority businesses their fair share of the economic pie and attempt to affect
the current status of African-Americans in the United States.
Daron S. Fitch
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